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State Antitakeover Laws and Voluntary
Disclosure
Yijiang Zhao, Arthur Allen, and Iftekhar Hasan∗
Abstract
We test the relationship between takeover protection and voluntary disclosure in a setting
of antitakeover laws in a firm’s state of incorporation. After correcting for the endogeneity
of firms’ incorporation choices, we find that firms incorporated in states with more anti-
takeover laws have higher levels of voluntary disclosure and stock market liquidity. Further
tests do not support shareholder demands being the driving force for this association. Our
findings are consistent with takeover protection and poor disclosure serving as substitute
mechanisms for deterring takeovers. Therefore, as antitakeover statutes mitigate takeover
threats, they enhance managers’ incentives to disclose more in order to realize capital mar-
ket benefits.
I. Introduction
Managers have incentives to withhold disclosures in order to mitigate share-
holder monitoring (Shleifer and Vishny (1989)). Corporate scandals such as those
of Enron and WorldCom suggest that withholding value-relevant information can
mislead investors, sometimes resulting in enormous welfare losses.1 In the United
States, post-Enron reforms generally focus on strengthening corporate governance
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1Firms voluntarily disclose a variety of value-relevant information such as earnings forecasts,
product market strategies, investment plans, and potential risks. As discussed by Healy and Palepu
(2003), Enron’s management provided only minimal disclosure regarding its relationship with three
previously unconsolidated special purpose entities, which left investors in the dark about the nature of
the firm’s transactions with these entities.
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(e.g., board monitoring) and requiring firms to provide more transparent financial
disclosure. Although prior studies (e.g., Karpoff and Malatesta (1989), Gompers,
Ishii, and Metrick (2003)) suggest that the takeover market disciplines manage-
ment and mitigates agency problems, it remains unclear how this mechanism
affects firms’ voluntary disclosure practices. Our purpose is to fill the void by ex-
amining the relation between takeover protection and voluntary disclosure
activity.
Takeover protection may have two opposite effects on a firm’s voluntary
disclosure activity. One, the conventional entrenchment view, suggests that en-
trenched managers would be likely to extract shareholder wealth (Fama (1980)).
Thus, according to this entrenchment view, as takeover protection entrenches
management, it increases managers’ incentives to withhold disclosures in order
to disguise their expropriation behavior. Two alternative views argue for the op-
posite effect. Because less disclosure eases takeover pressure by increasing po-
tential bidder uncertainty (e.g., Edlin and Stiglitz (1995)), the takeover-pressure
view suggests that less-protected managers would be more likely to withhold
disclosures in order to mitigate takeover threats. The other view, the shareholder-
demand view, argues that shareholders would demand more informative disclo-
sure as a compensatory monitoring mechanism when there is a less effective
takeover market. Therefore, the entrenchment view implies a negative association
between takeover protection and voluntary disclosure, whereas both the takeover-
pressure view and the shareholder-demand view predict a positive association.
Consistent with the takeover-pressure and shareholder-demand views, but not
the entrenchment view, we find that greater state law protection from takeovers
leads to more voluntary disclosure. We find further evidence suggesting that the
takeover-pressure view explains this result better than the shareholder-demand
view.
We examine this issue from the perspective of the state of incorporation,
because antitakeover statutes vary between states and U.S. firms are subject to
corporate laws in their state of incorporation. Using a self-selection regression
model, we control for the endogeneity in firms’ incorporation decision and the
resulting state-level takeover protection. As in prior studies (e.g., Bebchuk and
Cohen (2003), Wald and Long (2007)), we measure state-level takeover protection
by the number of antitakeover statutes adopted in the state. To measure the level
of voluntary disclosure, we follow Bens and Monahan (2004) and employ the
disclosure rankings developed by the Association for Investment Management
and Research (AIMR) as our proxy for voluntary disclosure.
We find evidence that firms incorporated in states with more antitakeover
statutes generally have higher levels of voluntary disclosure than firms subject
to fewer antitakeover statutes after accounting for self-selection bias. The re-
sults are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests, including those that enhance the
validity of instrumental variables, alternative measures of voluntary disclosure
and antitakeover legislation, and additional controls for factors that may cloud
our inferences. We also find that firms incorporated in states with more anti-
takeover statutes have higher levels of stock market liquidity, confirming that
capital market benefits accrue to these firms. In summary, we find a positive as-
sociation between antitakeover laws and disclosure, which is inconsistent with
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the entrenchment view but is consistent with the takeover-pressure view and the
shareholder-demand view.
If shareholder demand drives the positive relation between antitakeover
statutes and disclosure, then due to shareholders’ concerns about proprietary costs,
this relation should be weakened when the proprietary costs of disclosure are high.
In contrast, the takeover-pressure view, which argues for managerial self-interest
as the driving force, predicts no difference in this disclosure effect across firms
with differential levels of proprietary costs. We find that the interaction terms of
antitakeover statutes with proxies for proprietary costs are not statistically sig-
nificant. Thus, our results are more consistent with the takeover-pressure view
that managerial self-interest drives increased disclosure in less-robust takeover
markets.
Finally, we find that the effect of antitakeover statutes on voluntary dis-
closure is greater for firms with more firm-level takeover defenses. Our results
support the conjecture that managers of firms with more takeover defenses pos-
sess greater discretion over disclosure; thus, when further protected by state anti-
takeover statutes, they are willing to increase disclosure to realize greater capital
market benefits.
This study contributes to two streams of literature. First, it adds to the fi-
nance literature on how control considerations affect corporate decisions. Prior
studies find that managers mitigate takeover threats by either holding higher lev-
els of ownership (Cheng, Nagar, and Rajan (2005)), maintaining higher levels of
financial leverage (Garvey and Hanka (1999)),2 or encouraging employee own-
ership through defined contribution plans (Rauh (2006)). Complementing these
studies, our paper provides evidence that managers also reduce takeover pressure
by reducing transparency in voluntary disclosure.3
Second, this study contributes to the literature on the association between
corporate governance and voluntary disclosure practices. Recent studies (e.g.,
Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta (2005), Karamanou and Vafeas (2005)) empha-
size the role of disclosure in alleviating the adverse selection problem and gen-
erally find that stronger internal governance is associated with more transparent
disclosure. We focus on the disciplinary role of disclosure in mitigating moral
hazard-related agency problems and find that stronger external governance is as-
sociated with less transparent disclosure. In addition, our paper is the first to pro-
vide evidence that managers withhold information in the absence of antitakeover
statutes because of self-interest, not because of stockholders’ pressure to mini-
mize the proprietary costs of disclosure.
Our paper has important policy implications. Post-Enron reforms generally
focus on strengthening corporate governance and improving financial disclosure.
2Garvey and Hanka (1999) find that after the enactment of state antitakeover laws, firms incorpo-
rated in enacting states significantly reduce their financial leverage, consistent with financial leverage
serving as a form of takeover defense. However, after accounting for the endogenously determined
choice of where to incorporate, Wald and Long (2007) find that antitakeover laws are positively asso-
ciated with debt as a fraction of market value, possibly due to a lower market value for these firms.
3A concurrent study by Armstrong, Balakrishnan, and Cohen (2012) treats the passage of anti-
takeover laws as exogenous and finds that the laws are associated with less private information gath-
ering and more informative financial statements.
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Our evidence, however, suggests that stronger external governance may be
achieved at the cost of financial transparency. Policy makers need to be aware
of this cost before they reduce firms’ takeover protection.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section II reviews the lit-
erature and develops the hypotheses to be tested. Section III describes our sam-
ple selection procedure, main variable measurement, and descriptive statistics.
Section IV introduces our empirical models, presents the main results, and dis-
cusses additional analyses. Section V summarizes this study.
II. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
This section develops three competing views on the effect of takeover pro-
tection on firms’ voluntary disclosure activity: entrenchment, takeover pressure,
and shareholder demand. The entrenchment view argues that takeover protection
is likely to decrease disclosure. As takeover protection dampens the effective-
ness of external monitoring, entrenched managers are likely to engage in expro-
priation at the expense of shareholder interests (e.g., Fama and Jensen (1983),
Scharfstein (1988)). Recent studies (e.g., Bens and Monahan (2004), Hope and
Thomas (2008), Huang and Zhang (2012)) suggest that transparent disclosure al-
lows shareholders to monitor managers effectively. Conversely, poor disclosure
increases managers’ opportunities to extract shareholder wealth and reduces the
likelihood of reprisals. Thus, as takeover protection entrenches managers, they
are motivated to disclose less information.
In contrast to the entrenchment view, both the takeover-pressure view and the
shareholder-demand view posit that takeover protection is likely to increase dis-
closure. According to the takeover-pressure view, poor disclosure eases takeover
pressure by making it difficult for bidders to estimate the gains from acquiring tar-
get firms and replacing incumbent managers (Shleifer and Vishny (1989), Edlin
and Stigliz (1995)). Similarly, informative disclosure more fully reveals unre-
solved agency problems (e.g., inefficient internal capital transfer) and thus height-
ens external monitoring by takeover markets. Therefore, for job security concerns,
less-protected managers are likely to withhold information. As takeover protec-
tion affords greater job security for managers, they are less likely to resort to
withholding information to defend against takeovers.
Unlike the other views, the shareholder-demand view argues for an active
shareholder role in determining firms’ disclosure activity. Consistent with this
argument, studies (Healy, Hutton, and Palepu (1999), Jung (2013)) suggest that
shareholders’ demands create pressure for management to improve the firm’s fi-
nancial transparency. In the context of our study, as takeover protection weak-
ens external monitoring by takeover markets, it exacerbates agency problems
such as excessive executive compensation (Cheng and Indjejikian (2009)) and
larger amounts of inefficient, empire-building acquisitions (Gompers et al. (2003),
Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007)). Corporate disclosures and governance systems
are likely to be substitutes in addressing such problems (Bushman, Chen, Engel,
and Smith (2004)). Therefore, shareholders are likely to demand more disclosure
to maintain the monitoring of management when governance systems are weak-
ened by takeover protection.
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Two recent working papers provide limited evidence regarding the asso-
ciation between takeover protection and disclosure activity. Berger and Hann
(2002) find that subsequent to the increased segment disclosures required under
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 131, firms adopted more
antitakeover provisions. Our study differs from Berger and Hann (2002) in that
they examine the effect of disclosure on firm-level takeover defenses, whereas
we study the effect of state antitakeover statutes on disclosure. Using quarterly
management earnings forecasts as a proxy for voluntary disclosure and the Gov-
ernance Index of Gompers et al. (2003) as a proxy for takeover protection, Fu and
Liu (2007) find a positive relation between voluntary disclosure and takeover de-
fenses. However, Fu and Liu’s methodology suffers from three serious drawbacks.
First, as discussed in Section III, management forecasts constitute an extremely
small portion of a firm’s disclosure activity, which limits the generalizability of Fu
and Liu’s findings. Second, they do not control for the endogeneity of takeover
protection. Third, their findings are subject to alternative interpretations; thus,
the driving force underlying the association between voluntary disclosure and
takeover protection remains unclear.
During the mid- to late-1980s, at the behest of a few local firms, many states
enacted statutes on control share acquisition (CSA), fair price (FP), business
combination (BC) (i.e., no-freeze-out statutes), poison pill endorsement (PPE),
and constituencies (see Karpoff and Malatesta (1989) and Bebchuk and Cohen
(2003) for details of these statutes). The existing literature suggests that these
statutes provide strong inhibitions for takeovers. For example, Comment and
Schwert (1995) find that takeover premiums increased substantially after anti-
takeover statutes were enacted, suggesting that these laws raise the cost of acqui-
sitions and thus discourage potential bidders. Schwert (2000) further reports that
hostile takeover activity declined after these enactments. In addition, numerous
studies (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), Cheng et al. (2005), and Rauh
(2006)) find evidence that antitakeover statutes enhance managerial control and
weaken external monitoring from the takeover market.
In summary, the entrenchment view suggests that antitakeover statutes mo-
tivate managers to withhold disclosure, whereas both the takeover-pressure view
and the shareholder-demand view suggest that voluntary disclosure increases with
antitakeover statutes. Given these conflicting predictions, we test the following
nondirectional hypothesis, stated in its null form:
Hypothesis 1. The level of disclosure is unrelated to state antitakeover statutes.
Later, we discuss an approach to distinguish between the takeover-pressure
and shareholder-demand views. Our approach is conditional on our finding a
positive association between state antitakeover statutes and voluntary disclosure.
These two views diverge regarding who is the driving force behind this associa-
tion: shareholders or management. Prior theoretical studies (Verrecchia (1983),
Wagenhofer (1990)) suggest that disclosure is likely to involve proprietary costs
when revealing strategically important information to product market competi-
tors. Assuming no conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders, these
studies conclude that firms/shareholders have incentives to withhold information
that will jeopardize the firms’ competitive position (Healy and Palepu (2001)).
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Thus, if it is shareholders who are driving increased disclosure in the presence
of antitakeover statutes, this association should be weaker when a firm’s propri-
etary disclosure costs are higher.4 However, if it is managerial self-interest that
drives increased disclosure in the presence of antitakeover statutes, the strength
of this relation should not be related to a firm’s proprietary costs, because man-
agers are more concerned about the effect of disclosure on private benefits of
control (Berger and Hann (2007)).5 Therefore, our 2nd hypothesis to be tested is
as follows:
Hypothesis 2. The level of disclosure is unrelated to the interaction between state
antitakeover statutes and proprietary costs.
III. Sample Selection, Main Variable Measurement,
and Descriptive Statistics
A. Sample Selection
We select the sample period 1987–1995 for the empirical analyses. Follow-
ing Wald and Long (2007), we choose 1987 as the 1st year because the Supreme
Court ruled 2nd-generation antitakeover laws to be constitutional in CTS v. Dy-
namics Corp in 1987. The final year, 1995, is the last in our machine-readable
data set of AIMR ratings provided by Bushee and Noe (2000). Our initial sam-
ple contains all firm-years with complete AIMR ratings of the total disclosures
in Bushee and Noe’s data set. We then merge this data set with Compustat for
various financial data and exclude all firm-years for which the required data are
missing. We also retrieve information on the state of incorporation and firm-level
provisions from the RiskMetrics Corporate Governance database.6 In addition,
we utilize Bebchuk and Cohen’s (2003) state antitakeover index data set on an-
titakeover statutes. We further eliminate the following observations: i) financial
services and utility firms (Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 6000–
6500 and 4400–4999), since these firms are subject to heavy federal regulations,
and ii) firm-years in which firms reincorporated, because this change leads these
observations to be incomparable with others. The final data set for the multivariate
analyses consists of 368 firms with a total of 1,977 firm-years. Table 1 summarizes
the sample selection procedure.
4Under this view, increased disclosure prompted by the antitakeover statutes is likely to reduce
shareholder welfare due to proprietary costs of increased disclosure.
5Although prior studies (e.g., Harris (1998), Botosan and Stanford (2005)) report evidence con-
sistent with managers withholding disclosures to reduce proprietary costs, Berger and Hann (2007)
argue that such evidence is also consistent with an agency cost view that managers reduce disclosures
to weaken shareholder monitoring. In an attempt to distinguish between these two views, Berger and
Hann (2007) find evidence consistent with the agency-cost view but do not find evidence that managers
withhold information to reduce proprietary costs.
6 Data for firm-level provisions are only available for 1990, 1993, and 1995 during our sample
period. As Zhou (2001) suggests, firm-level governance-related variables are relatively time-invariant.
Following Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), we use the most recent lagged data to fill in missing years
between 1990 and 1995. We also use the data in 1990 to fill in missing years between 1987 and 1990.
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TABLE 1
Sample Selection Procedures
Table 1 presents the selection process for the entire sample of 1,977 observations.
Criteria Firm-Years
Bushee and Noe’s (2000) firm-years with nonmissing AIMR rankings in total disclosures 4,638
Less: Firm-years with missing financial data −1,040
Financial services and utility firms −1,235
Firm-years without RiskMetrics’ takeover defenses and incorporation data −215
Reincorporation firm-years −18
Firm-years before 1987 −153
Final sample 1,977
B. State Antitakeover Statutes
To proxy for the strength of state-level legal protection against hostile
takeovers, we follow recent studies (Qi and Wald (2008), Mansi, Maxwell, and
Wald (2010)) and create an index, StateLawIndex, equivalent to Bebchuk and
Cohen’s (2003) antitakeover index plus 1, if the recapture law exists in that state
and year, and 0 otherwise.7 Firms’ available takeover deterrents increase with the
number of antitakeover statutes governing the firm. In addition, a state amass-
ing antitakeover statutes signals that the state is likely to provide further takeover
protection (Bebchuk and Cohen (2003)). To the extent that the strength of this
signal increases with the number of statutes, it is also credible to argue that state-
level takeover protection increases with the number of statutes. Since firms in-
corporated in certain states, such as Pennsylvania, are able to opt out of some of
the antitakeover laws, we follow Wald and Long (2007) and use the RiskMetrics
database to adjust each firm’s index value by the firm’s opt-out decision. Bebchuk
and Cohen’s (2003) antitakeover index and its variants have been widely used as
proxies for the impact of the state-level legal protection on takeover vulnerabil-
ity in recent studies (e.g., Wald and Long (2007), Qi and Wald (2008), Francis,
Hasan, John, and Waisman (2010), and Mansi et al. (2010)).
C. Voluntary Disclosure
Our proxy for voluntary disclosure is based on the annual ratings of vol-
untary disclosure practices published in the Corporate Information Committee
Report of the AIMR. For each industry, the AIMR forms a subcommittee con-
sisting of top financial analysts tracking that industry, to assess the quality of
disclosure practices of selected firms and to assign ratings on an annual basis.8
7Bebchuk and Cohen’s (2003) antitakeover index, which is based on the work of Gartman (2000),
increases by 1 if the state has enacted a CSA statute, an FP statute, a BC statute, a PPE statute, or
a Constituencies statute. The recapture law is an antitakeover statute adopted by Pennsylvania and
Ohio that discourages potential acquirers by enabling the “recapture” of all short-term profits made
by a hostile acquirer. We also use Bebchuk and Cohen’s (2003) antitakeover index and recapture laws
separately and obtain essentially unchanged results (not reported).
8One potential problem with the AIMR ratings is that they are likely to capture analysts’ subjective
perceptions of voluntary disclosure rather than objectively measure disclosure. However, the AIMR
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Subcommittee members evaluate disclosure activity along three dimensions:
i) annual report/10-K disclosures, ii) other publications (e.g., interim report/10-Q)
disclosures, and iii) investor relations activities. The three component ratings are
combined to generate summary ratings and industry rankings for firms’ overall
disclosure practices.
Numerous studies (e.g., Sengupta (1998), Botosan and Plumlee (2002), Bens
and Monahan (2004), Yu (2005), Khurana, Pereira, and Martin (2006), and Huang
and Zhang (2012)) construct disclosure proxies based on AIMR ratings and find
evidence generally consistent with disclosure theories, indicating that the AIMR
ratings are valid for measuring the transparency of disclosure. In addition, rela-
tive to management forecasts-based measures used by Fu and Liu (2007), AIMR
ratings-based measures have two noteworthy merits. First, the AIMR ratings
represent a much more comprehensive measure of disclosure activity than man-
agement earnings forecasts (Lundholm and Myers (2002)), which constitute a
very small portion of a firm’s disclosure. Second, as discussed in the section
on hypothesis development, the association between takeover protection and dis-
closure activity is predicated on the monitoring role of disclosure. Information
conveyed in (quarterly) management forecasts can be easily obtained or verified
by outside investors through actual earnings realizations in subsequent periods
(Healy and Palepu (2001)). In contrast, other types of voluntary disclosure, such
as investment plans and disaggregated segment information prior to the SFAS
131, are not easily available to outside investors if management withholds such
information. Thus, to mitigate shareholder monitoring, managers are more likely
to disclose less in financial reports than to reduce the frequency and/or accuracy
of earnings forecasts.
The raw AIMR ratings are likely to lack comparability across industries
and/or across time because different subcommittees may apply period- or
industry-specific disclosure scales (Healy et al. (1999), Bushee and Noe (2000)).
To improve comparability, we follow prior research (e.g., Healy et al. (1999),
Bushee and Noe (2000)) and convert the firm’s AIMR industry ranking to a per-
centile within each industry-year:
Disc = (Nit − Rankit)/(Nit − 1),
where Nit is the number of firms ranked by analysts in firm i’s industry in year
t, and Rankit is firm i’s disclosure ranking relative to its industry peers in year t
as reported by the AIMR. The conversion methodology thus assigns 1 to firms
rated highest in their industry and 0 to those rated lowest. In our empirical anal-
yses later, we construct 4 measures of percentile ranks, TotalDisc, AnnualDisc,
OtherDisc, and RelationDisc, based on the above formula to reflect total disclo-
sure, annual disclosure, other disclosure, and investor relations, respectively. The
measures of percentile ranks of the AIMR ratings have been used in disclosure
reports only the consensus of subcommittee members without disclosing individual analyst ratings,
which reduces the incentive for individual analysts to strengthen their relations with management.
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studies that perform pooled time-series analyses (e.g., Lang and Lundholm (1993),
(1996), Lundholm and Myers (2002), and Bens and Monahan (2004)).
D. Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 lists the number of state antitakeover statutes adopted by each state
and the number of sample firms incorporated in each state. Approximately 56%
of the sample firms are incorporated in Delaware, which is comparable with prior
studies (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), Cheng et al. (2005), and Francis
et al. (2010)). Among the 34 states in our sample, only 4 states did not pass an
antitakeover statute during the sample period. States differ substantially in the
number of their antitakeover statutes, allowing us to examine the effect of state-
level takeover protection on disclosure.
TABLE 2
Number of Firms by State of Incorporation and Number of State Antitakeover Statutes
Table 2 reports the number of sample firms by state of incorporation and number of state antitakeover statutes (control
share statute, fair price statute, business combination statute, poison pill endorsement statute, constituencies statute, and
recapture statute).
State of Incorporation No. of Statutes No. of Firms Percent
Alabama 0 1 0.27%
Alaska 0 1 0.27%
California 0 8 2.17%
Colorado 1 1 0.27%
Connecticut 2 4 1.09%
Delaware 1 206 55.98%
Florida 4 3 0.82%
Georgia 4 5 1.36%
Hawaii 2 1 0.27%
Idaho 5 1 0.27%
Illinois 4 4 1.09%
Indiana 5 6 1.63%
Iowa 2 1 0.27%
Kentucky 4 1 0.27%
Maine 1 2 0.54%
Maryland 3 12 3.26%
Massachusetts 4 5 1.36%
Michigan 3 3 0.82%
Minnesota 4 2 0.54%
Missouri 4 5 1.36%
Nevada 5 5 1.36%
New Jersey 4 14 3.80%
New York 4 25 6.79%
North Carolina 3 3 0.82%
Ohio 6 13 3.53%
Oklahoma 1 1 0.27%
Oregon 4 2 0.54%
Pennsylvania 6 13 3.53%
South Carolina 3 3 0.82%
Texas 0 1 0.27%
Utah 2 1 0.27%
Virginia 4 12 3.26%
Washington 2 2 0.54%
Wisconsin 5 1 0.27%
Total — 368 100.00%
We control for a variety of firm, state, and industry characteristics and dis-
cuss their expected relations with firms’ disclosure quality and incorporation deci-
sions in Section IV. Table 3 provides detailed definitions of these variables. Panels
A and B of Table 4 report their descriptive statistics for all firm-years, firm-years
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TABLE 3
Variable Definitions
Table 3 provides detailed definitions of all variables. Compustat items are in parentheses.
Variable Definition
TotalDisc the percentile rank of the AIMR ratings of firm i’s total corporate disclosure in year t;
AnnualDisc the percentile rank of the AIMR ratings of firm i’s annual report disclosure in year t;
OtherDisc the percentile rank of the AIMR ratings of firm i’s other publications disclosure in year t;
RelationDisc the percentile rank of the AIMR ratings of firm i’s investor relations activities in year t;
StateLawIndex the antitakeover index in year t measured as the number of state antitakeover laws
(i.e., control share statute, fair price statute, business combination statute, poison
pill endorsement statute, constituencies statute, and recapture statute) in the state
where the firm is incorporated;
Log(FirmSize) the natural log of firm i’s total assets (#6) in year t−1, where total assets are restated into
a constant dollar of 2004 using the gross domestic product (GDP) deflator published
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis;
MktReturn firm i’s market-adjusted return measured as its annual return less the market return in
year t;
Std(Return) the standard deviation of firm i’s market-adjusted returns computed for the 10 years
preceding year t;
FinPerf the ratio of firm i’s operating income (#13) in year t to total assets (#6) in year t− 1;
CorrEarnRet the correlation between firm i’s annual earnings (#18 deflated by beginning-of-the-year
total assets) and market-adjusted annual stock returns computed for the 10 years
preceding year t;
Financing a dummy variable with a value of 1 if firm i did not have an acquisition that contributed
to sales (i.e., #249 = 0 or missing) but its number of outstanding shares increased
by at least 10%, or firm i’s long-term debts increased by at least 10% in year t
(Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan (2007));
Leverage the ratio of firm i’s total debts (#9 + #34) to total assets (#6) in year t− 1;
MB the ratio of the market value of the total firm to the book value of assets (#6) in year t−1,
where the market value of the total firm is measured as the book value of assets plus
the market value of common stock (#199 × #25) less the sum of the book value of
common stock (#60) and balance sheet deferred taxes (#74) (Kaplan and Zingales
(1997));
Log(Employees) the natural log of the number of firm i’s employees (#29) in year t− 1;
Employees/StatePopulation the ratio of the number of firm i’s employees (#29) to the population of its home state in
year t− 1;
TAconstraint a dummy variable with a value of 1 if there is a total asset constraint in the state where
the firm is incorporated, and 0 otherwise;
FirmGovIndex the number of firm-level antitakeover provisions in year t;
R&D% the ratio of firm i’s research and development (R&D) expenses (#46) to its sales (#12)
in year t− 1;
AdvExp% the ratio of firm i’s advertising expenses (#45) to its sales (#12) in year t− 1;
PP&E% the ratio of firm i’s net property, plant, and equipment (#8) to its sales (#12) in year t−1;
DepExp% the ratio of firm i’s depreciation expenses (#14) to its sales (#12) in year t− 1;
IndUnionization% the percentage of employed wage and salary workers, ages 16 and over, who are union
members in each 3-digit Census Industry Code (CIC) industry in year t− 1;
SalesGrowth the growth of sales (#12) measured as (salest−1 – salest−2) / salest−2;
Herfindahl the Herfindahl index of firm i, measured as the sum of squared market shares of all
firms in the same 2-digit SIC industry, where a firm’s market share is the firm’s sales
(#12) as a proportion of total sales in the industry;
IndusConcen industry concentration ratio measured as the percentage of market share owned by the
largest 4 firms in the same 2-digit industry, where a firm’s market share is the firm’s
sales (#12) as a proportion of total sales in the industry;
Illiquidity firm i’s annual average ratio of the daily absolute return to the dollar trading volume on
that day during each year (Amihud (2002));
TradingVolume the median of the log of firm i’s daily dollar trading volume during each year, where
dollar trading volume is restated into a constant dollar of 2004 using theGDPdeflator
published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis;
Turnover the median ratio of firm i’s daily trading volume to its shares outstanding during each
year;
HomeState a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the firm’s home state (i.e., the state where the firm
is headquartered) equals its state of incorporation, and 0 otherwise;
(continued on next page)
Zhao, Allen, and Hasan 647
TABLE 3 (continued)
Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
HighTech a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the firm’s SIC code is between 3500 and 3699, or
3800 and 3899, and 0 otherwise;
HomeStateLawIndex the antitakeover index in the state where the firm is headquartered, measured as the
number of state antitakeover laws (i.e., control share statute, fair price statute, busi-
ness combination statute, poison pill endorsement statute, constituencies statute,
and recapture statute);
HomeTAconstraint a dummy variable with a value of 1 if there is a total asset constraint in the state where
the firm is headquartered, and 0 otherwise;
InvMills1 the inverse Mills ratio calculated from the 1st-stage probit regression for the subset with
the dependent variable equal to 1;
InvMills0 the inverse Mills ratio calculated from the 1st-stage probit regression for the subset with
the dependent variable equal to 0;
StaggeredBoard a dummy variable with a value of 1 if firm i has a staggered board in year t, and 0
otherwise;
CNIndex the index compiled by Cremers and Nair (2005), based on three antitakeover provisions
(staggered boards, blank check preferred stock, and restrictions on shareholders’
calling special meetings or acting through written consent), where higher index lev-
els correspond to more firm-level takeover protection;
CEOOwn% the percentage of ownership by the CEO in year t;
BoardMeetings the number of board meetings held during year t;
Duality a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the CEO chairs the board in year t, and 0 otherwise;
AbnormalAccr the absolute value of firm i’s abnormal accruals measured as deviations from the pre-
dicted values from the corresponding industry-year regression, TAi,t/Asseti,t−1=
K1/Asseti,t−1+K2×(ΔRevi,t −ΔARi,t )/Asseti,t−1+K3×PP&Ei,t/Asseti,t−1+
εi,t, where TAi,t is firm i’s total accruals in year t, Asseti,t−1 is firm i’s total assets
(#6) at the end of year t− 1,ΔRevi,t is firm i’s change in revenues (#12) between
year t and year t − 1, ΔARi,t is firm i’s change in accounts receivable (#2) be-
tween year t and year t− 1, and PP&Ei,t is firm i’s net book value of property, plant,
and equipment (#8) at the end of year t.
TABLE 4
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of Table 4 reports summary statistics for the full sample during the period 1987–1995. Panel B of Table 4 reports
summary statistics for the subsamples of firms incorporated in-state and firms incorporated out-of-state. See Table 3 for
variable definitions.
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics for Full Sample (N = 1,977)
Variable Mean Stdev Min Max Q1 Median Q3
TotalDisc 0.518 0.312 0 1 0.250 0.515 0.800
StateLawIndex 1.887 1.542 0 6 1 1 3
TAconstraint 0.424 0.494 0 1 0 0 1
Log(FirmSize) 8.169 1.311 4.965 11.579 7.275 8.186 9.076
FirmSize 8,688.671 19,547.484 63.422 314,886.560 1,444.254 3,591.323 8,746.907
FinPerf 0.183 0.086 −0.008 0.490 0.126 0.174 0.228
MktReturn 0.996 0.278 0.366 1.921 0.819 0.982 1.147
Leverage 0.244 0.130 0 0.631 0.153 0.239 0.325
Std(Return) 0.294 0.158 0.094 0.904 0.188 0.251 0.346
MB 1.643 0.818 0.797 5.115 1.105 1.360 1.908
R&D% 0.027 0.044 0 0.212 0 0.005 0.036
AdvExp% 0.022 0.039 0 0.208 0 0 0.030
PP&E% 0.418 0.201 0.066 0.836 0.264 0.381 0.575
DepExp% 0.055 0.024 0.013 0.141 0.039 0.051 0.066
CorrEarnRet 0.166 0.335 −0.679 0.793 −0.060 0.198 0.424
Financing 0.374 0.484 0 1 0 0 1
FirmGovIndex 8.424 2.811 1 15 6 9 10
TradingVolume 15.837 1.304 13.367 18.033 14.872 15.893 16.826
Turnover 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.002 0.003
Illiquidity 0.006 0.011 0 0.096 0.001 0.002 0.006
(continued on next page)
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TABLE 4 (continued)
Descriptive Statistics
Panel B. Descriptive Statistics: Firms Incorporated In-State and Firms Incorporated Out-of-State
HomeState = 1 (n = 562) HomeState = 0 (n = 1,415)
Variable Mean Stdev Min Max Q1 Median Q3 Mean Stdev Min Max Q1 Median Q3
TotalDisc 0.546 0.309 0 1 0.281 0.561 0.813 0.506 0.313 0 1 0.240 0.500 0.800
StateLawIndex 3.238 1.540 0 6 2 4 4 1.350 1.169 0 5 1 1 1
TAconstraint 0.968 0.176 0 1 1 1 1 0.208 0.406 0 1 0 0 0
Log(FirmSize) 7.926 1.255 4.965 11.579 7.125 7.942 8.886 8.265 1.321 4.965 11.579 7.312 8.249 9.270
FirmSize 5,882.25 10,815.70 94.88 117,132.00 1,242.11 2,814.25 7,231.25 9,803.31 21,981.55 63.42 314,886.60 1,498.14 3,823.37 10,612.53
FinPerf 0.191 0.079 −0.008 0.490 0.139 0.185 0.235 0.179 0.088 −0.008 0.490 0.121 0.170 0.225
MktReturn 1.005 0.266 0.366 1.921 0.830 0.995 1.148 0.993 0.283 0.366 1.921 0.814 0.975 1.147
Leverage 0.220 0.117 0 0.631 0.137 0.224 0.287 0.254 0.133 0 0.631 0.158 0.246 0.339
Std(Return) 0.265 0.124 0.094 0.904 0.184 0.240 0.311 0.306 0.168 0.094 0.904 0.190 0.258 0.361
MB 1.688 0.803 0.797 5.115 1.142 1.382 2.002 1.625 0.823 0.797 5.115 1.086 1.352 1.849
R&D% 0.035 0.047 0 0.212 0 0.011 0.055 0.024 0.042 0 0.212 0 0.003 0.027
AdvExp% 0.019 0.034 0 0.208 0 0 0.028 0.023 0.041 0 0.208 0 0 0.032
PP&E% 0.405 0.169 0.066 0.836 0.306 0.381 0.492 0.423 0.213 0.066 0.836 0.252 0.380 0.603
DepExp% 0.053 0.019 0.013 0.130 0.040 0.050 0.062 0.056 0.025 0.013 0.141 0.038 0.052 0.067
CorrEarnRet 0.129 0.336 −0.679 0.793 −0.104 0.142 0.382 0.180 0.334 −0.679 0.793 −0.040 0.222 0.443
Financing 0.393 0.489 0 1 0 0 1 0.366 0.482 0 1 0 0 1
FirmGovIndex 7.888 2.672 2 13 6 8 10 8.637 2.838 1 15 7 9 11
TradingVolume 15.721 1.258 13.367 18.033 14.846 15.725 16.598 15.882 1.319 13.367 18.033 14.872 15.955 16.903
Turnover 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.003
Illiquidity 0.006 0.010 0 0.096 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.006 0.012 0 0.095 0.001 0.002 0.006
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incorporated in-state, and firm-years incorporated out-of-state, respectively. The
median total assets (FirmSize) of all firm-years is $3.591 billion, suggesting that
our sample firms are generally large. However, the minimum and 1st quartile of
total assets are $63.4 million and $1.444 billion, respectively, for all firm-years,
which implies that our sample also includes relatively small firms. The descriptive
statistics of TotalDisc, StateLawIndex, and various control variables are gener-
ally comparable with those reported in prior studies (Lang and Lundholm (1993),
Lundholm and Myers (2002)). In addition, approximately 30% of our sample
firms are incorporated in-state (HomeState = 1), a result consistent with the find-
ings of prior studies (e.g., Wald and Long (2007)).
We also examine correlations among variables included in the disclosure
analyses for firms incorporated in-state, firms incorporated out-of-state, and all
sample firms, respectively. (For parsimony, we do not tabulate these results.)
The correlation between TotalDisc and StateLawIndex is positive and significant
at p < 0.01 for both the full sample and the subsample of firms incorporated out-
of-state, consistent with the notion that state-level takeover protection increases
firms’ voluntary disclosure. In addition, TotalDisc is positively correlated with
Log(FirmSize), FinPerf, MktReturn, PP&E%, and FirmGovIndex, and negatively
associated with Std(Return) and CorrEarnRet, suggesting the necessity to con-
trol for these variables in the multivariate analyses. To minimize outlier effects,
we winsorize continuous variables at the top and bottom 1 percentile.
IV. Research Design and Results
In this section, we explain the research design and report all empirical results.
All of our tests employ 2-stage self-selection models to account for endogeneity
bias resulting from firms’ incorporation decisions. Section IV.A examines the de-
terminants of a firm’s incorporation decision as the 1st-stage model. Section IV.B
analyzes the impact of antitakeover statutes on voluntary disclosure and addresses
two potential concerns regarding our 2-stage method. Section IV.C examines the
effect of antitakeover statutes on stock market liquidity. Section IV.D examines
whether the voluntary disclosure results are driven primarily by shareholder de-
mand or managerial self-interest. Finally, Section IV.E examines the interaction
between the statutes and firm-level antitakeover provisions.
A. Endogenous Incorporation Decisions
In the United States, firms can choose in which state to incorporate and are
subject to that state’s corporate laws. Recent studies (e.g., Bebchuk and Cohen
(2003), Wald and Long (2007)) suggest that firms whose home states have more
antitakeover statutes are more likely to incorporate in-state, suggesting that man-
agers migrate to states with strong antitakeover statutes. Thus, a firm’s state of
incorporation and the state’s antitakeover laws cannot be taken as exogenous.
A model that ignores self-selection would yield biased estimates of antitakeover
statutes’ effects on voluntary disclosure. We use a Heckman (1976) 2-stage self-
selection model to correct for self-selection bias resulting from firms’ incorpo-
ration decisions. In the 1st stage, following Wald and Long, we estimate the
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following probit regression of a firm’s in-state versus out-of-state incorporation
decision:
HomeStateit = α0 + α1 Log(FirmSize)it + α2 FinPerfit + α3 MBit(1)
+α4 R&D%it + α5 AdvExp%it + α6 PP&E%it
+α7 DepExp%it + α8 Log(Employees)it
+α9 Employees/StatePopulationit
+α10 HomeStateLawIndexit + α11 HomeTAconstraintit
+
∑
λpIndustryp +
∑
δtYeart + uit.
In this equation, HomeState is a dummy variable reflecting the binary out-
come of whether the firm incorporates in-state or out-of-state. We include firm,
state, and industry characteristics as the determinants of firms’ incorporation deci-
sions. Specifically, firm characteristics include firm size (Log(FirmSize)), financial
performance (FinPerf ), market-to-book ratio (MB), asset tangibility (R&D%,
AdvExp%, PP&E%, and DepExp%), and firm employment (Log(Employees) and
Employees/StatePopulation). In addition, we include HomeStateLawIndex, a mea-
sure of antitakeover statutes in the firm’s home state, and HomeTAconstraint, a
dummy variable of total asset constraints in its home state, to capture the ef-
fect of the home state’s statutory restrictions, because managers prefer states
with more restrictive antitakeover statutes or less-stringent payout constraints
(Wald and Long (2007)). Finally, as in Wald and Long, we control for industry
fixed effects, including HighTech for the technology industry and dummy vari-
ables for other industries, and year fixed effects.
Successful use of the Heckman (1976) 2-stage procedure requires the pres-
ence of at least one explanatory variable that is correlated with the endogenous
incorporation choice in the 1st-stage equation, but is not correlated with the 2nd-
stage error term when other covariates are controlled (Puhani (2000)). To meet
exclusion restrictions, we use two employment measures, the number of employ-
ees (Log(Employees)) and the ratio of employees to state population (Employ-
ees/StatePopulation), as instrumental variables in equation (1) for two reasons.9
First, state legislatures generally respond to in-state (potentially voting) organized
employees more than out-of-state (nonvoting) dispersed shareholders (Romano
(1987)). Accordingly, firms with more employees generally have greater ability
to seek protective legislation in their home states. Consistent with this argument,
Wald and Long (2007) find that firms with more employees are more likely to
incorporate in their home state. In addition, a given number of employees would
also give a firm more political clout when its home state’s population is lower.
Thus, our 1st-stage incorporation equation includes the two employment mea-
sures as important explanatory variables. Second, it is unlikely that these two vari-
ables affect disclosure, because according to the disclosure literature (e.g., Lang
9As discussed later, we control for home state fixed effects (i.e., HomeLocation dummy vari-
ables) in the 2nd-stage disclosure equation (i.e., equation (2) of our paper). Accordingly, Home-
StateLawIndex and HomeTAconstraint, which capture the legal environment of the firm’s home state,
are subsumed within these state dummy variables; thus, they are not used as instrumental variables.
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and Lundholm (1993)), the major firm-level determinants of voluntary disclosure
are firm size, performance, performance variability, and management/investor
information asymmetry. Bushee, Matsumoto, and Miller (2003) also find an in-
significant association between the number of employees and voluntary disclosure.
Thus, we believe that the two employment measures are valid instruments for the
incorporation decision.10
As column 1 of Table 5 shows, larger firms (Log(FirmSize)) are less likely
to incorporate in-state, a result consistent with Bebchuk and Cohen’s (2003) extra
cost story that the extra transaction costs involved in out-of-state incorporation
have lower weight for larger firms. As in Wald and Long (2007), more profitable
TABLE 5
Probit Regressions on Firms’ Incorporation Decisions
Table 5 reports the results of probit regressions on firms’ in-state versus out-of-state incorporation decisions during the
period 1987–1995. Column 1 presents the results on the full sample, and column 2 presents the results on a narrower
sample after excluding i) both out-of-state incorporating firms whose home state has more antitakeover laws than Delaware,
and ii) in-state incorporating firms whose home state has fewer antitakeover laws than Delaware. The dependent variable
HomeState for the 2 columns is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the firm’s home state equals its state of incorporation,
and 0 otherwise. See Table 3 for other variable definitions. For brevity, the coefficients on industry and year dummy variables
are not presented. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, for 2-tailed tests. Z-
statistics using standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parentheses.
Variable 1 2
Intercept 2.115*** 30.957***
(3.83) (5.21)
Log(FirmSize) −0.546*** −6.797***
(−6.38) (−5.63)
FinPerf 1.245* −19.883***
(1.70) (−3.39)
MB −0.131* 0.926*
(−1.72) (1.84)
R&D% 6.169*** 32.888***
(4.52) (3.79)
AdvExp% −4.413*** 10.145
(−2.95) (0.85)
PP&E% 0.759** −4.412
(2.09) (−1.35)
DepExp% −13.127*** 15.032
(−4.63) (1.15)
Log(Employees) 0.465*** 5.357***
(5.26) (5.42)
Employees/StatePopulation −3.022 70.035***
(−0.90) (5.30)
HomeStateLawIndex 0.195*** 10.416***
(8.69) (8.23)
HomeTAconstraint −0.809*** −5.233***
(−3.56) (−6.40)
HighTech 0.854*** −0.900
(6.83) (−0.91)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Sample size 1,977 973
Likelihood ratio 435.055*** 1,337.097***
McFadden R2 0.184 0.994
Partial R2 0.018 0.013
10In Section IV.B.2, we also perform tests to mitigate concerns over the validity of the instruments.
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firms (FinPerf ) are more likely to remain in-state. In addition, the coefficients
of MB, R&D%, AdvExp%, PP&E%, and DepExp% are statistically significant,
suggesting that growth and asset opacity measures are good predictors of a firm’s
incorporation choice. Between the two instrumental variables, Log(Employees)
is significantly and positively associated with the likelihood of in-state incorpora-
tion, suggesting that firms with more employees benefit from their increased polit-
ical influence (Wald and Long (2007)).11 Finally, we find that firms headquartered
in states with more antitakeover laws (HomeStateLawIndex) or looser payout
restrictions (HomeTAconstraint) are more likely to incorporate in their headquar-
ters state, which is consistent with Wald and Long’s findings that managers pre-
fer to incorporate in states that are less restrictive or more friendly to incumbent
managers.
B. Disclosure Analysis
1. Disclosure Model
To test the hypothesis that state antitakeover laws are associated with vol-
untary disclosure, we include the inverse Mills ratios based on the results from
equation (1) as additional regressors in the following equation (2):
TotalDiscit = βj0 + βj1 StateLawIndexit + βj2 Log(FirmSize)it(2)
+βj3 FinPerfit + βj4 MktReturnit + βj5 MBit
+βj6 R&D%it + βj7 AdvExp%it + βj8 PP&E%it
+βj9 DepExp%it + βj10 Std(Return)it + βj11 CorrEarnRetit
+βj12 Financingit + βj13 Leverageit + βj14 FirmGovIndexit
+βj15 TAconstraintit + βj16 InvMillsj,it
+
∑
ψjqHomeLocationq +
∑
λjkIndustryk
+
∑
δjtYeart + εj,it,
where j = 0 for firms incorporated out-of-state, and j = 1 for firms incorporated
in-state.
We control for firm, state, and industry characteristics that potentially af-
fect a firm’s disclosure. As in prior studies (Lang and Lundholm (1993), Nagar,
Nanda, and Wysocki (2003)), we control for firm characteristics, including firm
size (Log(FirmSize)), firm performance (FinPerf and MktReturn), market-to-book
ratio (MB), performance variability (Std(Return)), the correlation between re-
turns and earnings (CorrEarnRet), and the need for external capital (Financing).
In addition, we include the 4 measures of asset opacity or tangibility (R&D%,
AdvExp%, PP&E%, and DepExp%). Prior studies (e.g., Lang and Lundholm
(1993)) generally find evidence that voluntary disclosure increases with firm size
11Since the primary purpose of implementing exclusion restrictions is to mitigate potential
collinearity problems caused by controlling for inverse Mills ratios (Puhani (2000)), we also calculate
the variance inflation factors (VIFs) in our 2nd-stage disclosure regressions. All the VIFs are lower
than the cutoff point of 10 (Kutner, Nachtsheim, and Neter (2004)), which suggests that including
inverse Mills ratios in the disclosure equation does not introduce serious multicollinearity problems.
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and performance but report mixed findings regarding the relationship between
voluntary disclosure and other variables. As we focus on the impact of state an-
titakeover statutes, we also include FirmGovIndex, a measure of firm-level anti-
takeover provisions based on Gompers et al. (2003), and Leverage, a measure
of financial leverage (Garvey and Hanka (1999)), to control for firm-specific
takeover vulnerability.
In addition to antitakeover laws, corporate laws of the states of incorporation
also differ in their restrictions on firm distributions to shareholders.12 The pri-
mary goal of these state-level payout restrictions is to protect the interests of debt
holders by preserving the minimum value of corporate assets necessary to secure
payment of debt-holder claims. To the extent that these restrictions and volun-
tary disclosure are substitutes in mitigating the agency cost of debt,13 we expect
a negative association between statutory payout restrictions and firms’ voluntary
disclosure. Thus, following Francis et al. (2010), we include the dummy variable
TAconstraint to capture differences in state-of-incorporation payout restrictions.
We further add a set of state-of-location dummy variables (HomeLocation) to con-
trol for differences across the states where our sample firms are headquartered.
Finally, given the panel nature of our data, we control for industry and year fixed
effects. In estimating the 2nd-stage disclosure model, we allow the standard er-
rors to cluster by state of incorporation to account for arbitrary correlation across
firms incorporated in the same state and serial correlation across years within the
same firm.14
2. Results of Disclosure Analyses
We estimate equation (2) separately for firms incorporated in-state and out-
of-state.15 In columns 1 and 2 of Table 6, we present the 2nd-stage results cor-
responding to the 1st-stage analyses reported in column 1 of Table 5. For firms
incorporated out-of-state (HomeState = 0), which account for approximately 70%
of our sample firms, the coefficient on StateLawIndex is positive and statistically
significant (p < 0.01), suggesting that firms incorporated in a state with more
antitakeover laws tend to provide higher levels of disclosure. By comparison, the
effect of state antitakeover laws is less pronounced and not significant for firms
incorporated in-state (HomeState= 1). In addition, inverse Mills ratios (InvMills1
12According to Peterson and Hawker (1997), states such as Arizona, Delaware, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Vermont adopt few restrictions on
firm distributions. Firms incorporated in these states are allowed to pay dividends out of surplus or,
in case surplus is not available, out of the net profits for the fiscal year in which the dividend is
declared and/or the preceding fiscal year. At the other end of the spectrum are California and Alaska,
the two states with the most stringent dividend statutes, which require a minimum 1.25 ratio between
the book value of the total assets (exclusive of intangible assets such as goodwill) and total liabilities
before a distribution can be made to investors. Most states generally adopt relatively mild restrictions.
For example, Arkansas, Florida, and many other states allow financial distributions whenever the
corporation’s total assets exceed total liabilities.
13Sengupta (1998) suggests that voluntary disclosure reduces creditors’ perception of default risk
for the disclosing firm and thus lowers its cost of debt.
14Alternatively, we cluster the standard errors either by state of location or by firm and find similar
results (untabulated).
15We perform several sensitivity tests of disclosure analyses and report the results in the Appendix.
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TABLE 6
The Effect of State Antitakeover Laws on Voluntary Disclosure
The columns under “HomeState = 1” show the 2nd-stage regression results of sample firms that are incorporated in-state
during the period 1987–1995. The columns under “HomeState = 0” show the 2nd-stage regression results of sample firms
that are incorporated out-of-state during the period 1987–1995. Columns 1 and 2 report the results on the full sample;
columns 3 and 4 report the results on the sample after excluding both i) out-of-state incorporating firms whose home state
has more antitakeover laws than Delaware, and ii) in-state incorporating firms whose home state has fewer antitakeover
laws than Delaware; columns 5 and 6 report the results on a subsample of firm-years whose home state has a right-to-
work law; and columns 7 and 8 report the results with the firm’s industry unionization rate as an additional control. In all
regressions, the dependent variable TotalDisc is the percentile rank of the AIMR ratings of firm i’s total voluntary disclosure
in year t. StateLawIndex is the antitakeover index in year t measured as the number of state antitakeover laws (i.e., CSA
statute, FP statute, BC statute, PPE statute, constituencies statute, and recapture statute) in the state where the firm is
incorporated. See Table 3 for other variable definitions. All regressions include home state location, industry, and year
fixed effects. For brevity, the coefficients on these dummy variables are not presented. *, **, and *** represent significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, for 2-tailed tests. Z-statistics using standard errors clustered by states of
incorporation are reported in parentheses.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
HomeState
Exp.
Variable Sign 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
Intercept 0.163 –1.063*** –0.147 –2.274*** –2.656*** –1.656*** 0.206 –0.859***
(0.48) (–6.75) (–0.51) (–16.25) (–4.21) (–10.64) (0.60) (–5.17)
StateLawIndex ? –0.004 0.051*** 0.000 0.057*** 0.047 0.037* –0.009 0.055***
(–0.24) (3.25) (0.01) (3.26) (0.65) (1.87) (–0.48) (3.45)
Log(FirmSize) + 0.010 0.084*** 0.028 0.085*** 0.308*** 0.136*** 0.013 0.083***
(0.36) (4.68) (1.00) (5.06) (8.20) (7.11) (0.44) (6.75)
FinPerf + 0.291 0.290 0.090 0.569** 0.148 –0.488* 0.349 0.198
(0.68) (1.69) (0.19) (2.78) (0.71) (–1.94) (0.79) (1.45)
MktReturn + 0.016 0.093*** 0.021 0.034 0.129* 0.075** 0.011 0.087***
(0.35) (3.92) (0.44) (0.64) (2.13) (2.48) (0.23) (3.57)
Leverage + 0.166 0.045 0.256 0.009 –1.076*** 0.092 0.157 0.029
(0.91) (0.46) (1.29) (0.14) (–4.85) (0.94) (0.83) (0.23)
Std(Return) ? –0.015 0.002 0.090 0.090*** 0.499 0.115 –0.011 0.039
(–0.06) (0.05) (0.34) (3.01) (1.20) (1.08) (–0.04) (0.77)
MB ? –0.057 0.038*** –0.064 –0.008 0.101 0.101*** –0.065 0.040***
(–1.06) (3.18) (–1.11) (–0.40) (1.37) (4.87) (–1.19) (3.24)
R&D% ? 2.276*** 1.004** 1.714** 0.849** 15.258* 2.532*** 2.275*** 0.856**
(3.44) (2.60) (2.41) (2.82) (2.07) (7.45) (3.38) (2.19)
AdvExp% ? –0.673 0.423 –0.289 –0.717 1.305 0.426 –0.622 0.442
(–1.34) (1.10) (–0.58) (–1.07) (0.45) (0.65) (–1.26) (1.36)
PP&E% ? 0.580** 0.096 0.468 0.211* 0.723*** –0.125 0.546** 0.017
(2.34) (0.72) (1.70) (1.96) (4.99) (–1.32) (2.20) (0.12)
DepExp% ? –5.166** –1.320* –3.701** –2.793*** –1.547 1.826* –5.131** –0.743
(–2.43) (–1.95) (–2.07) (–7.87) (–0.66) (2.07) (–2.39) (–0.95)
CorrEarnRet ? –0.104* –0.053 –0.109* –0.204*** –0.229*** –0.129*** –0.100* –0.083**
(–1.86) (–1.54) (–1.98) (–3.54) (–7.85) (–4.06) (–1.77) (–2.77)
Financing ? –0.033 0.027 –0.037 –0.016 –0.096** –0.006 –0.035 0.021
(–1.26) (1.65) (–1.33) (–1.48) (–2.79) (–0.21) (–1.29) (1.55)
FirmGovIndex ? 0.018 0.018*** 0.022 –0.006** 0.009 –0.014 0.019 0.014**
(1.36) (3.68) (1.61) (–2.18) (0.21) (–1.47) (1.36) (2.68)
TAconstraint – –0.173 –0.092* 0.049 –0.230* –0.259 –0.242** –0.179 –0.100*
(–0.41) (–1.82) (0.13) (–2.13) (–0.73) (–2.38) (–0.39) (–1.93)
IndUnionization% – 0.105 –0.381***
(0.46) (–4.23)
InvMills1 ? 0.143** 0.243 –0.002 0.119**
(2.11) (1.11) (–0.01) (2.16)
InvMills0 ? –0.099* –0.373*** –0.208** –0.120**
(–1.87) (–3.48) (–2.63) (–2.17)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 562 1,415 515 458 107 310 555 1,347
R2 0.479 0.273 0.495 0.365 0.832 0.623 0.475 0.281
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and InvMills0) are significantly associated with disclosure, indicating the impor-
tance of correcting for self-selection bias.
In terms of other control variables, in the HomeState = 0 regression, a
firm’s disclosure is positively associated with its size (Log(FirmSize)) and perfor-
mance (MktReturn), consistent with the findings of prior studies (e.g., Lang and
Lundholm (1993)). For these firms, higher MB and R&D% are associated with
higher levels of disclosure, suggesting that growth firms are likely to disclose
more in order to mitigate information asymmetry. In addition, out-of-state in-
corporating firms with more firm-level provisions (FirmGovIndex) have higher
levels of voluntary disclosure. Because these provisions reduce takeover vulnera-
bility (Gompers et al. (2003)), this result also suggests that more-protected firms
tend to provide more transparent disclosures. Finally, the coefficient on TAcon-
straint is significantly negative, suggesting that state-level payout restrictions are
a substitute for disclosure to protect debt-holder interests. By comparison, in the
HomeState = 1 regression, fewer variables are significantly associated with dis-
closure, though most of these variables have the same signs as the HomeState= 0
regression.
A potential concern with the foregoing 2-stage analysis is that it corrects
for selection bias resulting from in-state or out-of-state incorporation, rather than
directly controlling bias from firms choosing to incorporate in states with stronger
antitakeover laws. U.S. firms can incorporate either in their home state; in
Delaware, where more than 50% of public firms are incorporated; or in another
state. As prior studies (e.g., Romano (1987), Daines (2001)) point out, compared
to other states, Delaware is appealing to many public firms for its specialized legal
capital, significant legal precedents, and responsiveness in updating legislation.
Therefore, a firm might choose to incorporate in Delaware for reasons other than
seeking stronger takeover protection. To ensure our inference is sound, we use
Delaware as a benchmark and drop from our sample i) out-of-state incorporating
firms whose home state has more antitakeover laws than Delaware, and ii) in-state
incorporating firms whose home state has fewer antitakeover laws than Delaware.
Subsequently, only 3.5% of observations in the out-of-state incorporating sample
have weaker antitakeover laws in the state of incorporation than their home state,
suggesting that nearly all of these firms self-select into out-of-state incorporation
for stronger antitakeover laws.
We present the 1st-stage results on this narrower sample in column 2 of
Table 5 and the corresponding 2nd-stage results in columns 3 and 4 of Table 6.16
Both Log(Employees) and Employees/StatePopulation are positively associated
with the likelihood of in-state incorporation. Thus, a firm’s employment level rel-
ative to its home state’s population also affects its in-state political influence and
incorporation decision. As shown in column 4, StateLawIndex remains positively
associated with disclosure for out-of-state incorporating firms.
Another potential concern with our design is that the 2 employment-related
instrumental variables could be correlated with firm disclosure policy. Prior studies
16For this narrower sample, we also perform the same set of multivariate analyses (not tabulated)
as those discussed in Sections IV.C–E, and we obtain results that are similar to those reported in this
paper.
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(Hilary (2006), Scott (1994)) suggest that firms dealing with strong unions reduce
voluntary disclosure in order to improve their bargaining position. To the extent
that firms with a large number of employees are more labor intensive and are
more likely to be unionized, our instruments could be correlated with firm dis-
closure policy through this collective bargaining channel and, therefore, could be
invalid. To address this concern, we adopt two approaches. First, we perform a
2-stage analysis on a subsample of firm-years whose home state has a right-
to-work law.17 Since such laws severely weaken union bargaining power, it is
unlikely that firm employment affects disclosure policy through the collective
bargaining channel. As shown in columns 5 and 6 of Table 6, the coefficient on
StateLawIndex remains positive and significant (p < 0.1) in the HomeState = 0
regression and insignificant in the HomeState = 1 regression. Because the sub-
sample approach may lack statistical power due to using a substantially smaller
sample, we adopt a 2nd approach by directly controlling for the unionization rate
(IndUnionization%) in a firm’s industry in the disclosure regression using the
Union Membership and Coverage Database.18 The results in columns 7 and 8
show that in the out-of-state sample, firms protected by more antitakeover statutes
disclose more transparently. In addition, IndUnionization% is negatively associ-
ated with voluntary disclosure, consistent with managers reducing disclosure in
the presence of strong unions (Hilary).
C. Market Liquidity Analysis
Our findings so far suggest that firms incorporated in states with more an-
titakeover statutes provide higher levels of disclosure. To corroborate these find-
ings, we further examine the effect of antitakeover statutes on market liquidity.
Prior studies (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), Brown, Hillegeist, and Lo (2004))
show that increased disclosure is related to capital market benefits such as in-
creased liquidity. If firms incorporated in states with more antitakeover statutes
disclose more information (consistent with our earlier results), we expect such
disclosure-related benefits to be more pronounced for these firms.
To test this prediction, we adopt 3 widely used measures of liquidity: dollar
volume of trading (TradingVolume), stock turnover (Turnover), and stock illiq-
uidity (Illiquidity).19 Consistent with trading volume and turnover being proxies
for liquidity, several studies (e.g., Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998),
Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Anshuman (2001)) find that expected stock returns
17We obtain the information on right-to-work laws from the National Right to Work Web site
(http://www.nrtw.org/b/rtw faq.htm). Among the 22 states that have a right-to-work law, 20 states
enacted the law prior to our sample period, 1 state (Texas) enacted the law during our sample period
(1993), and 1 state (Oklahoma) enacted the law after our sample period (2001).
18This database, which is maintained by Barry Hirsch and David Macpherson (http://www
.unionstats.com), provides private and public sector labor union membership estimates based on the
Census Industry Code (CIC) industries. Since CIC 3-digit and SIC 3-digit industries are not exactly
matched, and the database does not cover all CIC industries, we lose some observations when we
control for the unionization rate in the regression.
19We do not use bid-ask spreads to measure liquidity for two reasons. First, according to the data
description guide of Center for Research in Security Prices, a continuous series of bid and ask data for
NYSE and AMEX securities are only available since Dec. 28, 1992, which reduces our sample size
substantially. Second, the bid-ask spread is a highly imperfect measure of liquidity.
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are negatively associated with these two measures. Higher values of TradingVol-
ume and Turnover suggest higher levels of liquidity. Although these two measures
capture trading frequency or willingness, they fail to account for trading costs and
may capture effects not related to liquidity (Lesmond (2005)). We therefore adopt
a 3rd proxy, the illiquidity measure (Illiquidity) introduced by Amihud (2002).
Following Kyle’s (1985) price impact definition of liquidity, this ratio reflects the
daily price response associated with $1 of trading volume; thus, a higher value of
Illiquidity indicates less liquidity.
As in the disclosure analyses, we adopt a 2-stage framework to investigate
the relation between state antitakeover laws and market liquidity. Since the 1st-
stage estimation results for the market liquidity analyses are essentially identical
to those reported in Table 5, we do not tabulate these results. Table 7 reports
2nd-stage estimation results from regressing measures of market liquidity on the
same set of explanatory variables in equation (2). Consistent with the disclosure
TABLE 7
The Effects of State Antitakeover Statutes on Market Liquidity
The columns under “HomeState = 1” show the 2nd-stage regression results of sample firms that are incorporated in-state
during the period 1987–1995. The columns under “HomeState = 0” show the 2nd-stage regression results of sample firms
that are incorporated out-of-state during the period 1987–1995. The dependent variable TradingVolume for columns 1 and
2 is the median of the log of firm i’s daily dollar trading volume during each year, where dollar trading volume is restated into
a constant dollar of 2004 using the GDP deflator published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The dependent variable
Turnover for columns 3 and 4 is the median ratio of firm i’s daily trading volume to its shares outstanding during each year.
The dependent variable Illiquidity for columns 5 and 6 is firm i’s annual average ratio of the daily absolute return to the dollar
trading volume on that day during each year. StateLawIndex is the antitakeover index in year t measured as the number of
state antitakeover laws (i.e., CSA statute, FP statute, BC statute, PPE statute, constituencies statute, and recapture statute)
in the state where the firm is incorporated. See Table 3 for other variable definitions. All regressions include home state
location, industry, and year fixed effects. For brevity, the coefficients on these dummy variables are not presented. *, **,
and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, for 2-tailed tests. Z-statistics using standard
errors clustered by states of incorporation are reported in parentheses.
TradingVolume Turnover Illiquidity
1 2 3 4 5 6
HomeState
Variable 1 0 1 0 1 0
Intercept 8.151*** 5.246*** 0.004** 0.001 0.059*** 0.084***
(12.12) (16.70) (2.58) (1.04) (3.74) (6.60)
StateLawIndex −0.028 0.076** −0.000 0.000*** −0.001 −0.002***
(−0.78) (2.25) (−1.17) (3.66) (−1.15) (−2.89)
Log(FirmSize) 0.828*** 1.015*** −0.000 0.000** −0.003*** −0.006***
(13.83) (75.58) (−1.27) (2.18) (−3.30) (−19.49)
FinPerf 2.039*** 2.417*** 0.001 0.002*** −0.009 −0.024***
(2.83) (10.92) (0.74) (5.67) (−0.61) (−12.28)
MktReturn 0.231*** 0.345*** −0.000 0.000 −0.004* −0.000
(2.91) (8.01) (−0.21) (0.56) (−1.77) (−0.14)
Leverage −0.371 −0.742*** 0.001 0.001*** 0.001 0.009**
(−0.64) (−5.93) (0.93) (6.65) (0.18) (2.18)
Std(Return) 0.565 0.821*** 0.004*** 0.002*** −0.001 −0.005**
(1.45) (5.66) (3.32) (11.74) (−0.10) (−2.15)
MB 0.401*** 0.649*** −0.000 −0.000* −0.003 −0.001***
(4.94) (22.13) (−1.67) (−1.98) (−1.17) (−9.71)
R&D% 4.987** −0.485 0.009** −0.005*** 0.033 −0.010
(2.55) (−0.61) (2.16) (−4.48) (0.75) (−1.45)
AdvExp% 2.550** 0.912* 0.001 0.003*** −0.026 −0.004
(2.74) (1.97) (0.41) (5.02) (−1.68) (−1.06)
PP&E% 0.084 0.391*** −0.001 0.001 −0.016** −0.004**
(0.14) (5.75) (−1.36) (1.57) (−2.12) (−2.47)
(continued on next page)
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TABLE 7 (continued)
The Effects of State Antitakeover Statutes on Market Liquidity
TradingVolume Turnover Illiquidity
1 2 3 4 5 6
HomeState
Variable 1 0 1 0 1 0
DepExp% −1.326 −0.989 0.004 −0.006*** 0.050 0.027***
(−0.45) (−1.24) (0.73) (−4.34) (0.76) (3.26)
CorrEarnRet −0.056 −0.045 −0.000 0.000 0.002 −0.001
(−0.58) (−1.16) (−1.65) (1.65) (0.87) (−1.70)
Financing 0.053 −0.028** −0.000 0.000** −0.001* 0.001**
(1.51) (−2.64) (−0.26) (2.85) (−2.02) (2.22)
FirmGovIndex 0.027 0.022*** 0.000 0.000*** −0.001** −0.000
(1.60) (4.10) (1.59) (9.19) (−2.15) (−0.75)
TAconstraint −1.058*** −0.209 −0.002* −0.001*** 0.004 0.005*
(−3.43) (−1.66) (−1.97) (−4.54) (0.57) (2.04)
InvMills1 −0.102 0.000 −0.004
(−0.97) (0.03) (−1.04)
InvMills0 0.029 0.000 0.001
(0.28) (0.31) (1.53)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 531 1,354 524 1,344 514 1,302
R2 0.923 0.899 0.611 0.521 0.649 0.500
analyses, the effect of state antitakeover laws is primarily concentrated among
firms incorporated out-of-state. Specifically for these firms, StateLawIndex is neg-
atively associated with Illiquidity and positively associated with TradingVolume
and Turnover (p < 0.05 or p < 0.01) after correcting for potential self-selection
bias. The coefficients of StateLawIndex do not attain significance for firms incor-
porated in-state. Combined with the results of Table 6, the evidence corroborates
the argument that enhanced takeover protection allows firms to disclose more and
thus improves firms’ information environments.
D. Managerial Self-Interest or Shareholder Demand?
In this section, we perform analyses to distinguish between the shareholder-
demand view and the takeover-pressure view. As the foregoing discussion in
Section II suggests, the shareholder-demand view is supported if we find a nega-
tive interaction between state antitakeover statutes and proprietary costs. We focus
on two factors that are likely to affect a firm’s proprietary costs: innovation and
industry competition. A firm relying more heavily on innovation enjoys greater fu-
ture opportunities (e.g., Griliches (2000)), and it faces stronger pressure to protect
these opportunities. We therefore expect the firm’s proprietary costs of disclosure
to increase with its innovation and growth opportunities. We use three alternative
proxies for future growth opportunities and levels of innovation: R&D intensity
(R&D%), market-to-book ratio (MB), and growth (SalesGrowth).20 Proprietary
20Prior studies (e.g., Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001)) report positive associations between these
measures and firm-level patents.
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costs also decrease with industry competition because excess profits tend to oc-
cur in less competitive industries and disclosures from firms in these industries
are therefore more likely to provide competitors with useful information (e.g.,
Harris (1998), Botosan and Stanford (2005)). To measure industry competition,
we follow Harris and focus on industry concentration, which is estimated with the
Herfindahl index (Herfindahl) and industry concentration ratio (IndusConcen).
We use the same framework as our primary disclosure analyses to test for the
interaction effect. Since our analyses to this point show that the disclosure effect
of antitakeover laws is primarily concentrated among firms incorporated out-of-
state, we test the interaction between antitakeover laws and proxies for innovation
and industry competition for these firms. Table 8 presents the 2nd-stage results of
the tests. In the first 2 columns, we add to our baseline model (equation (2)) an in-
teraction term between StateLawIndex and one of the two proxies for growth and
innovation (R&D% and MB), because the model has included R&D% and MB.
In the remaining 3 columns (columns 3–5), we add to the baseline model both a
stand-alone term of growth (SalesGrowth) or industry competition (Herfindahl or
IndusConcen) and a corresponding interaction term. As Table 8 shows, the coef-
ficients on the interaction terms are not significantly negative at the conventional
levels.21 Thus, we do not find strong evidence that shareholders demand more
TABLE 8
The Interaction Effect of State Antitakeover Statutes and Proprietary Costs
All columns show the 2nd-stage regression results of sample firms that are incorporated out-of-state during the period
1987–1995. In all regressions, the dependent variableTotalDisc is the percentile rank of the AIMR ratings of firm i’s total vol-
untary disclosure in year t. StateLawIndex is the antitakeover index in year t measured as the number of state antitakeover
laws (i.e., CSA statute, FP statute, BC statute, PPE statute, constituencies statute, and recapture statute) in the state where
the firm is incorporated. R&D% is the ratio of firm i’s R&D expenditures to its sales (#12) in year t− 1; MB is the ratio of firm
i’s total market value to its book value of assets; SalesGrowth is firm i’s growth of sales measured as (salest−1 – salest−2)/
(salest−2); Herfindahl is the Herfindahl index of firm i, measured as the sum of squared market shares of all firms in the
same 2-digit SIC industry, where a firm’s market share is the firm’s sales (#12) as a proportion of total sales in the industry;
IndusConcen is the industry concentration ratio measured as the percentage of market share owned by the largest 4 firms
in the same 2-digit industry, where a firm’s market share is the firm’s sales (#12) as a proportion of total sales in the industry.
See Table 3 for other variable definitions. All regressions include home state location, industry, and year fixed effects. For
brevity, the coefficients on these dummy variables are not presented. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively, for 2-tailed tests. Z-statistics using standard errors clustered by states of incorporation are
reported in parentheses.
Variable Exp. Sign 1 2 3 4 5
Intercept −1.064*** −1.010*** −1.057*** −1.045*** −1.014***
(−6.72) (−6.33) (−6.80) (−6.55) (−5.89)
StateLawIndex ? 0.052*** 0.007 0.050*** 0.035 0.034
(3.00) (0.24) (3.25) (1.39) (0.88)
StateLawIndex× R&D% ? −0.133
(−0.35)
StateLawIndex× MB ? 0.019*
(1.84)
(continued on next page)
21The positive coefficient on StateLawIndex×MB is not consistent with the shareholder-demand
view. One potential explanation is that in the presence of strong takeover protection, managers of
firms with higher information asymmetry (MB) are likely to disclose more because greater capital
market benefits accrue to these firms due to increased disclosure.
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TABLE 8 (continued)
The Interaction Effect of State Antitakeover Statutes and Proprietary Costs
Variable Exp. Sign 1 2 3 4 5
StateLawIndex× SalesGrowth ? 0.013
(0.55)
StateLawIndex× Herfindahl ? 0.170
(0.81)
StateLawIndex× IndusConcen ? 0.033
(0.45)
SalesGrowth ? −0.036
(−1.08)
Herfindahl ? −0.669**
(−2.74)
IndusConcen ? −0.222**
(−2.33)
Log(FirmSize) ? 0.084*** 0.081*** 0.083*** 0.087*** 0.087***
(4.72) (4.66) (4.56) (5.15) (5.10)
FinPerf + 0.286 0.271* 0.286 0.235 0.243
(1.65) (1.99) (1.61) (1.33) (1.37)
MktReturn + 0.093*** 0.100*** 0.094*** 0.097*** 0.096***
(3.96) (4.29) (4.03) (4.02) (3.92)
Leverage ? 0.045 0.000 0.064 0.031 0.033
(0.46) (0.00) (0.66) (0.30) (0.32)
Std(Return) ? 0.004 −0.001 −0.005 0.017 0.015
(0.08) (−0.03) (−0.10) (0.37) (0.33)
MB ? 0.038*** 0.004 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.041***
(3.10) (0.42) (3.26) (3.53) (3.59)
R&D% ? 1.091*** 0.927** 1.035** 0.960** 0.939**
(3.15) (2.30) (2.74) (2.48) (2.55)
AdvExp% ? 0.411 0.322 0.432 0.408 0.395
(1.04) (0.85) (1.14) (1.07) (1.05)
PP&E% ? 0.098 0.131 0.092 0.106 0.101
(0.73) (1.13) (0.68) (0.80) (0.76)
DepExp% ? −1.335* −1.565** −1.338* −1.228* −1.205*
(−2.02) (−2.80) (−1.97) (−1.83) (−1.83)
CorrEarnRet ? −0.054 −0.047 −0.057 −0.054 −0.056
(−1.53) (−1.32) (−1.59) (−1.52) (−1.54)
Financing ? 0.027 0.026 0.029* 0.026 0.026
(1.65) (1.60) (1.76) (1.59) (1.56)
FirmGovIndex ? 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018***
(3.73) (3.46) (3.67) (3.55) (3.54)
TAconstraint − −0.092* −0.092 −0.093* −0.090* −0.091*
(−1.84) (−1.66) (−1.86) (−1.78) (−1.77)
InvMills0 ? −0.097* −0.075 −0.099* −0.082 −0.082
(−1.93) (−1.48) (−1.89) (−1.46) (−1.45)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 1,415 1,415 1,413 1,415 1,415
R2 0.273 0.285 0.275 0.277 0.276
disclosure as a costly monitoring mechanism in the presence of a less-robust
takeover market.
To summarize, the results from Tables 6–8 are more consistent with the
takeover-pressure view that managers prefer more transparent disclosure when
their job security is enhanced. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) find that anti-
takeover statutes lower firms’ operating performance, suggesting that these
statutes hurt shareholder interests. Francis et al. (2010) instead report evidence
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consistent with antitakeover statutes mitigating the agency costs of debt and thus
benefiting bondholders. Distinct from these studies, our findings suggest that an-
titakeover legislation is likely to enhance shareholder welfare in terms of its po-
tential to improve corporate disclosure. In addition to increasing market liquidity,
transparent disclosure allows shareholders to better monitor managers, which im-
proves managers’ investment efficiency (Bens and Monahan (2004), Hope and
Thomas (2008)). Thus, the overall net social benefit of antitakeover laws remains
an open question.
E. Tests of Interaction between Antitakeover Statutes and Firm-Level
Antitakeover Provisions
The effect of antitakeover statutes is likely to vary depending on firm-level
takeover protection. Karpoff and Malatesta (1989) and Cheng et al. (2005) sug-
gest that firm-level antitakeover protection may serve as an effective substitute
for antitakeover statutes in protecting management. To the extent that the protec-
tion effect of antitakeover statutes decreases with firm-level antitakeover provi-
sions, we expect the association between the statutes and voluntary disclosure to
be less positive for firms with greater firm-level takeover protection. However,
firm-level governance characteristics may reflect the allocation of power between
managers and shareholders (Bebchuk and Fried (2006)). If managers of firms with
more firm-level antitakeover provisions have greater power relative to sharehold-
ers (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009)) and thus are likely to determine whether
to disclose or withhold information, the effect of antitakeover statutes on volun-
tary disclosure would be more positive for firms with more firm-level takeover
protection.
In addition to FirmGovIndex, we employ two parsimonious measures of
firm-level takeover protection, CNindex and StaggeredBoard. Following Cremers
and Nair (2005), the measure CNindex focuses on the three antitakeover provisions
(staggered boards, blank check preferred stock, and restrictions on shareholders’
calling special meetings or acting through written consent) that are thought to be
more effective in deterring takeover activity. As in Bebchuk and Cohen (2005),
we use the existence of a staggered board (StaggeredBoard) as a proxy for en-
hanced takeover protection, because a staggered board, which classifies the firm’s
directors into classes, can create monumental hurdles for a bidder to mount a
successful takeover.
To test the two contradictory hypotheses, we add an interaction term of
StateLawIndex and one of the three measures of firm-level takeover protection
to the baseline model and test the significance of the coefficient on the interaction
term for firms incorporated out-of-state. As shown in Table 9, StateLawIndex ×
CNindex and StateLawIndex × StaggeredBoard are positively associated with
disclosure (p < 0.01 or p < 0.05). To the extent that firm-level provisions primar-
ily indicate limitations on shareholder power (Bebchuk et al. (2009)), our results
are consistent with the argument that entrenched managers have greater authority
in determining the level of disclosure, and thus the effect of antitakeover statutes
on disclosure is more positive for these managers.
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TABLE 9
The Interaction of State Antitakeover Statutes and Firm-Level Takeover Protection
All columns show the 2nd-stage regression results of sample firms that are incorporated out-of-state during the period
1987–1995. In all regressions, the dependent variable TotalDisc is the percentile rank of the AIMR ratings of firm i’s total
voluntary disclosure in year t. StateLawIndex is the antitakeover index in year t measured as the number of state anti-
takeover laws (i.e., CSA statute, FP statute, BC statute, PPE statute, constituencies statute, and recapture statute) in the
state where the firm is incorporated. FirmGovIndex is the number of firm-level antitakeover provisions; CNindex is the index
based on three antitakeover provisions (staggered boards, blank check preferred stock, and restrictions on shareholders’
calling special meetings or acting through written consent); and StaggeredBoard is a dummy variable with a value of 1
if the firm has a staggered board structure, and 0 otherwise. See Table 3 for other variable definitions. All regressions
include home state location, industry, and year fixed effects. For brevity, the coefficients on these dummy variables are not
presented. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, for 2-tailed tests. Z-statistics
using standard errors clustered by states of incorporation are reported in parentheses.
Variable Exp. Sign 1 2 3
Intercept −1.039*** −1.021*** −1.051***
(−5.15) (−6.42) (−6.70)
StateLawIndex ? 0.033 −0.024 0.005
(0.85) (−0.80) (0.25)
StateLawIndex× FirmGovIndex ? 0.002
(0.48)
StateLawIndex× CNindex ? 0.041**
(2.46)
StateLawIndex× StaggeredBoard ? 0.057***
(2.89)
Log(FirmSize) + 0.085*** 0.088*** 0.090***
(4.80) (5.10) (4.91)
FinPerf + 0.288 0.293** 0.297*
(1.70) (2.16) (1.98)
MktReturn + 0.094*** 0.092*** 0.089***
(4.11) (3.85) (3.79)
Leverage ? 0.044 0.067 0.065
(0.44) (0.76) (0.78)
Std(Return) ? 0.007 0.019 0.017
(0.15) (0.46) (0.37)
MB ? 0.038*** 0.025* 0.024*
(3.14) (1.93) (1.81)
R&D% ? 0.987** 0.806* 0.760
(2.61) (1.84) (1.64)
AdvExp% ? 0.400 0.353 0.428
(1.02) (0.84) (0.91)
PP&E% ? 0.095 0.097 0.098
(0.71) (0.60) (0.59)
DepExp% ? −1.266* −1.111 −1.195*
(−2.04) (−1.58) (−1.80)
CorrEarnRet ? −0.054 −0.061* −0.063**
(−1.56) (−2.05) (−2.11)
Financing ? 0.027 0.024 0.026*
(1.62) (1.73) (1.74)
FirmGovIndex ? 0.014***
(3.78)
CNindex ? −0.038***
(−3.73)
StaggeredBoard ? −0.052**
(−2.23)
TAconstraint − −0.090* −0.096* −0.100*
(−1.79) (−2.03) (−1.92)
InvMills0 ? −0.102* −0.118** −0.120**
(−2.08) (−2.37) (−2.31)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Location fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 1,415 1,415 1,415
R2 0.274 0.268 0.269
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V. Summary
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of external oversight
from takeover markets on voluntary disclosure activity. Although takeover pro-
tection is generally regarded as a type of weak governance that entrenches man-
agement and destroys firm value, studies to date have proposed three competing
views with two contradictory effects that such protection may have on disclo-
sure activity. Due to a lack of sufficient evidence, whether takeover protection
increases or decreases a firm’s disclosure still remains an ambiguous issue.
In this paper, we focus on the effect of state antitakeover laws on volun-
tary disclosure, because cross-state variation in antitakeover legislation allows
us to operationalize the theoretical construct of takeover protection. We employ a
self-selection model to correct for the endogeneity of firms’ state-of-incorporation
decision. Using the disclosure rankings developed by the AIMR as our proxy for
voluntary disclosure and controlling for both financial and governance factors that
are likely to affect disclosure quality, we find that firms incorporated in states with
more antitakeover statutes have significantly higher analyst rankings of disclosure
and greater market liquidity than firms governed by fewer antitakeover statutes.
The results remain robust to a battery of additional tests, including a refined 2-
stage methodology that directly endogenizes a firm’s state-of-incorporation de-
cision based on a state’s antitakeover laws. In addition, we do not find evidence
that the effect of antitakeover statutes on disclosure decreases with the proprietary
costs of disclosure, suggesting that the disclosure effect of the statutes is likely to
be driven more by managerial self-interest than by shareholder demand. Finally,
we find that the effect of the statutes on disclosure becomes increasingly positive
as firm-level antitakeover provisions increase.
In addition to confirming the role of opaque disclosure in the market for cor-
porate control (Edlin and Stiglitz (1995)), this paper provides additional insights
into the roles of corporate governance in affecting voluntary disclosure activity.
In contrast to prior studies (Ajinkya et al. (2005), Karamanou and Vafeas (2005))
that generally find a positive association between strong governance and volun-
tary disclosure, we find that takeover protection, as a type of weak governance, is
positively associated with voluntary disclosure activity. Given that severe market
meltdowns often follow the announcements of poor disclosures, regulators and
legislators need to be cautious in reducing takeover protection before they have
fully considered the costs and benefits.
Appendix. Additional Disclosure Analyses
In this Appendix, we perform several additional tests of the effect of antitakeover
statutes on voluntary disclosure and present the results in Tables A1 and A2. First, follow-
ing prior studies (Sengupta (1998), Nagar et al. (2003)), we test the association between
the raw AIMR disclosure ratings of total disclosure (as an alternate measure of disclo-
sure) and antitakeover statutes, which yield essentially unchanged results. We also dis-
aggregate TotalDisc into annual disclosure ranking (AnnualDisc), other disclosure ranking
(OtherDisc), and investor relations ranking (RelationDisc), and we find that StateLawIndex
remains positively associated with all three component rankings for out-of-state incor-
porating firms. Second, we include managerial ownership (CEOOwn%), the number of
board meetings (BoardMeetings), duality of CEO/chairman (Duality), and earnings
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TABLE A1
The Effect of State Antitakeover Statutes on the Components of Total Disclosure
and the Raw Score of Total Disclosure
The columns under “HomeState = 1” show the 2nd-stage regression results of sample firms that are incorporated in-state
during the period 1987–1995. The columns under “HomeState = 0” show the 2nd-stage regression results of sample firms
that are incorporated out-of-state during the period 1987–1995. The dependent variable AnnualDisc for columns 1 and 2
is the percentile ranks of the AIMR ratings of each firm’s annual report disclosure; the dependent variable OtherDisc for
columns 3 and 4 is the percentile ranks of the AIMR ratings of each firm’s other publications disclosure; the dependent
variable RelationDisc for columns 5 and 6 is the percentile ranks of the AIMR ratings of each firm’s investor relations
activities; and the dependent variable RawScore for columns 7 and 8 is the raw AIMR ratings of each firm’s total disclosure.
StateLawIndex is the antitakeover index in year t measured as the number of state antitakeover laws (i.e., CSA statute, FP
statute, BC statute, PPE statute, constituencies statute, and recapture statute) in the state where the firm is incorporated.
See Table 3 for other variable definitions. All regressions include home state location, industry, and year fixed effects. For
brevity, the coefficients on these dummy variables are not presented. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively, for 2-tailed tests. Z-statistics using standard errors clustered by states of incorporation are
reported in parentheses.
AnnualDisc OtherDisc RelationDisc RawScore
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
HomeState
Exp.
Variable Sign 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
Intercept −0.001 −0.945*** 0.383 −0.992*** 0.331 −0.698*** 53.062*** 21.775***
(−0.00) (−4.50) (0.80) (−6.86) (0.91) (−6.11) (5.65) (3.49)
StateLawIndex ? 0.011 0.055** −0.002 0.047** −0.003 0.042*** 0.762* 1.674***
(0.46) (2.66) (−0.11) (2.37) (−0.14) (3.52) (1.92) (3.30)
Log(FirmSize) + 0.036 0.081*** −0.006 0.079*** 0.001 0.076*** 0.302 2.086***
(1.47) (3.77) (−0.21) (6.11) (0.02) (5.92) (0.36) (4.79)
FinPerf + −0.034 0.212 −0.183 −0.072 0.266 0.147 13.853 11.746
(−0.07) (1.33) (−0.59) (−0.34) (0.63) (0.99) (1.32) (1.63)
MktReturn + 0.053 0.070* −0.027 0.080*** 0.068 0.104*** 0.402 1.102*
(1.05) (1.97) (−0.52) (5.34) (1.40) (3.06) (0.33) (1.77)
Leverage ? 0.057 −0.085 0.104 0.033 0.089 0.080 2.157 −1.864
(0.36) (−0.82) (0.51) (0.30) (0.52) (1.24) (0.42) (−0.55)
Std(Return) ? −0.166 −0.035 −0.189 0.106** 0.278 0.043 9.947* −1.479
(−0.48) (−0.86) (−0.84) (2.37) (1.67) (0.64) (2.01) (−1.04)
MB ? 0.031 0.030 −0.036 0.037** −0.068 0.065*** −1.681 0.321
(0.68) (1.60) (−0.61) (2.59) (−1.38) (3.97) (−1.35) (1.08)
R&D% ? 1.362 2.285*** 1.964 0.691 2.439*** 0.299 72.484*** 33.466*
(1.20) (5.90) (1.43) (1.59) (3.10) (0.91) (4.04) (2.08)
AdvExp% ? −0.647 −0.120 0.388 0.450 −1.148 0.657** −24.812 14.978
(−1.34) (−0.39) (0.53) (1.17) (−1.69) (2.40) (−1.28) (1.41)
PP&E% ? 0.374 0.109 0.285 0.173* 0.314 0.033 7.617 1.448
(1.39) (0.93) (1.11) (1.77) (1.65) (0.23) (1.16) (0.40)
DepExp% ? −2.599 −0.776 −2.726 −0.922 −1.535 −1.795** −75.529 −29.109
(−1.07) (−1.21) (−1.28) (−1.71) (−0.96) (−2.33) (−1.50) (−1.46)
CorrEarnRet ? −0.044 −0.051* −0.042 −0.057 −0.099 −0.081** −2.803 −2.095
(−0.68) (−1.77) (−0.57) (−1.24) (−1.44) (−2.32) (−1.62) (−1.57)
Financing ? −0.035 0.025 −0.034 0.020 −0.036 0.024 −0.177 0.544
(−1.47) (1.59) (−1.03) (1.71) (−1.55) (1.41) (−0.28) (0.91)
FirmGovIndex ? 0.022* 0.015*** 0.010 0.013** 0.021** 0.017*** 0.488 0.586***
(1.88) (2.98) (0.62) (2.71) (2.43) (4.17) (1.46) (3.25)
TAconstraint − 0.219 −0.096 −0.023 −0.117** −0.597* −0.057 −1.035 −3.149*
(0.61) (−1.55) (−0.05) (−2.17) (−1.71) (−1.27) (−0.12) (−1.93)
InvMills1 ? 0.142** 0.026 0.182*** 4.985**
(2.10) (0.29) (3.04) (2.42)
InvMills0 ? −0.079 −0.221*** −0.075 −5.300***
(−1.58) (−5.89) (−1.38) (−2.90)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 526 1,327 526 1,327 526 1,337 526 1,324
R2 0.470 0.237 0.456 0.232 0.445 0.252 0.759 0.615
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TABLE A2
Other Robustness Tests
The columns under “HomeState = 1” show the 2nd-stage regression results of sample firms that are incorporated in-state
during the period 1987–1995. The columns under “HomeState = 0” show the 2nd-stage regression results of sample firms
that are incorporated out-of-state during the period 1987–1995. In all regressions, the dependent variable TotalDisc is
the percentile rank of the AIMR ratings of firm i’s total voluntary disclosure in year t. StateLawIndex is the antitakeover
index in year t measured as the number of state antitakeover laws (i.e., CSA statute, FP statute, BC statute, PPE statute,
constituencies statute, and recapture statute) in the state where the firm is incorporated. See Table 3 for other variable
definitions. All regressions include home state location, industry, and year fixed effects. For brevity, the coefficients on these
dummy variables are not presented. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, for
2-tailed tests. Z-statistics using standard errors clustered by states of incorporation are reported in parentheses.
Controlling for Controlling Including
Other Governance for Earnings Financial
Measures Quality and Utility Firms
1 2 3 4 5 6
HomeState
Exp.
Variable Sign 1 0 1 0 1 0
Intercept 0.523 −0.898*** 0.166 −1.083*** −0.118 −0.994***
(1.19) (−7.89) (0.48) (−6.87) (−0.59) (−6.32)
StateLawIndex ? −0.010 0.052*** −0.004 0.051*** −0.022 0.037**
(−0.53) (3.44) (−0.26) (3.27) (−1.68) (2.37)
Log(FirmSize) + 0.013 0.090*** 0.010 0.085*** 0.052** 0.087***
(0.31) (5.43) (0.36) (4.75) (2.16) (6.64)
FinPerf + 0.037 0.296* 0.296 0.302 0.647 0.311**
(0.09) (1.82) (0.69) (1.70) (1.64) (2.30)
MktReturn + −0.022 0.117*** 0.015 0.093*** 0.023 0.078***
(−0.50) (4.11) (0.32) (4.12) (0.70) (4.92)
Leverage ? 0.072 0.161 0.169 0.050 0.200 −0.165
(0.34) (1.42) (0.93) (0.49) (1.26) (−1.67)
Std(Return) ? −0.042 0.012 −0.015 −0.014 0.075 −0.081**
(−0.13) (0.23) (−0.06) (−0.30) (0.38) (−2.14)
MB ? −0.078 0.034* −0.058 0.040*** −0.044 0.029**
(−1.37) (1.95) (−1.05) (3.29) (−1.19) (2.47)
R&D% ? 4.471*** 2.106*** 2.261*** 0.994** 0.708 0.822**
(4.84) (4.16) (3.37) (2.56) (1.02) (2.21)
AdvExp% ? −1.007* 0.145 −0.673 0.428 −0.397 0.443
(−1.99) (0.45) (−1.35) (1.12) (−0.76) (1.24)
PP&E% ? 0.530 0.197 0.576** 0.086 0.385* 0.053
(1.41) (1.45) (2.34) (0.62) (1.79) (0.46)
DepExp% ? −4.173 −1.110 −5.187** −1.265* −2.381 −0.635
(−1.54) (−1.19) (−2.40) (−1.86) (−1.50) (−1.07)
CorrEarnRet ? −0.065 −0.056* −0.104* −0.052 −0.053 −0.089**
(−0.76) (−1.84) (−1.89) (−1.49) (−1.11) (−2.77)
Financing ? −0.019 0.043*** −0.033 0.028* −0.021 0.018*
(−0.72) (4.33) (−1.26) (1.74) (−0.99) (1.92)
FirmGovIndex ? 0.020 0.018** 0.018 0.018*** 0.016 0.019***
(1.16) (2.72) (1.34) (3.73) (1.61) (5.10)
TAconstraint − −0.366 −0.098 −0.172 −0.092* 0.186 −0.068
(−0.92) (−1.69) (−0.41) (−1.80) (1.07) (−1.35)
InvMills1 ? 0.137 0.143** 0.082
(1.58) (2.13) (1.66)
InvMills0 ? −0.028 −0.107* −0.058**
(−0.77) (−2.05) (−2.54)
CEOOwn% ? 0.826 −1.014***
(0.84) (−2.90)
BoardMeetings ? −0.023* −0.014***
(−1.74) (−3.15)
Duality − −0.157** −0.032***
(−2.25) (−2.88)
AbnormalAccr ? 0.034 −0.020
(0.37) (−1.12)
(continued on next page)
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TABLE A2 (continued)
Other Robustness Tests
Controlling for Controlling Including
Other Governance for Earnings Financial
Measures Quality and Utility Firms
1 2 3 4 5 6
HomeState
Exp.
Variable Sign 1 0 1 0 1 0
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 468 1,245 562 1,406 1,037 1,897
R2 0.540 0.317 0.479 0.276 0.313 0.261
quality (AbnormalAccr) in the disclosure equation. Prior studies (e.g., Ajinkya et al. (2005),
Francis, Nanda, and Olsson (2008), Karamanou and Vafeas (2005)) suggest that these gov-
ernance characteristics are associated with voluntary disclosure. The positive association
between state antitakeover statutes and voluntary disclosure remain positive after control-
ling for these factors. Finally, following Giroud and Mueller (2010), we also include fi-
nancial services and utility firms (SIC codes 6000–6500 and 4400–4999) in the sample,
and still find a positive association between StateLawIndex and TotalDisc for firms that
incorporate out-of-state.
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